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Abstract:  
We propose a measure of the extent to which a financial sector is connected to the real 
economy. The Measure of Connectedness is the share of credit market instruments 
represented by claims whose direct counterpart belongs to the non-financial sectors. 
The aggregate U.S. Measure of Connectedness declines by about 27% in the period 
1952-2009. We suggest that this increase in disconnectedness between the financial 
sector and the real economy may have dampened the sensitivity of the real economy to 
monetary shocks. We present a stylized model that illustrates how interbank trading can 
reduce the sensitivity of lending to the entrepreneur’s net worth, thereby dampening the 
credit channel transmission of monetary policy. Finally, we interact our measure with 
both a SVAR and a FAVAR for the U.S. economy, and establish that the impulse 
responses to monetary policy shocks are dampened as the level of connection declines. 
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1 Introduction
Two facts constitute the background of this paper. First, the U.S. financial system underwent
a radical transformation during the last decades. The complexity and the nature of the
process of financial intermediation changed substantially.1 Figure 1 confirms this well known
phenomenon by reporting the evolution of the share of total assets in the U.S. economy
held by three major groups of actors: i) the traditional actors (commercial banks, savings
institutions and credit unions), ii) the insurance, pension and mutual funds, and iii) the so
called “shadow banking system” (Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSE), ABS issuers,
GSE mortgage pools, finance companies, brokers and dealers).2 While the share of assets
held by the traditional actors declined from about 60% to roughly 30% from 1952 to 2010,
the share of assets held by the “new” actors increased from almost zero to more than 40%
in 2006. This structural transformation, as many commentators pointed out, may have been
at the core of the global financial crisis that started in 2007 and became a global economic
crisis in 2008 and 2009.3
Second, a well known result in the economic literature is that in more recent samples, the
sensitivity of real variables to monetary policy shocks has declined. Common explanations for
this empirical finding include an increase in the effectiveness of monetary policy or a decrease
in the size of these shocks. Another frequently conjectured (but less studied) hypothesis
is that structural changes in the financial sector contributed to the changing nature of the
monetary policy transmission mechanism.4 Arguably, part of the difficulty in addressing this
hypothesis is the lack of a suitable measure of the structural transformation that affected
the U.S. financial system.5
In this paper, we propose such a measure and study its implications for monetary policy.
1See Gorton and Metrik (2012).
2See Adrian and Shin (2010), Poznar et al (2012) and references therein for a comprehensive explanation
of the concept of Shadow Banking.
3See for example Brunnermeier (2009) and Gorton (2009).
4A notable exception is Dynan et al (2006), who analyses the impact of monetary policy on real activity
before and after relevant regulatory changes.
5Contributions in this literature analyze the different responsiveness across different sub-samples of the
data.
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We were inspired by the view that emerged after the crisis among several academics and
policymakers, according to which the financial sector has become disconnected from the real
economy.6
In this vein, we propose a measure of the extent to which a financial sector is connected
to the real economy. The Measure of Connectedness is the share of the credit market instru-
ments represented by claims whose direct counterpart belongs to the non-financial sectors
(households, non-financial firms and government). We compute the measure of connected-
ness for each major player in the U.S. financial system for the period 1952-2009, as well as
an aggregate measure, using data from the Flows of Funds. The aggregate U.S. Measure of
Connectedness declines by about 27% in the period 1952-2009. The drop in the aggregate
measure is mostly driven by a composition effect, namely the rising importance of finan-
cial institutions that are relatively “disconnected” from the real economy (such as the ABS
issuers).7
We study how the decline in “connectedness” may have changed the transmission of
monetary policy. We propose a stylized model to illustrate how inter-bank trading, by
increasing the liquidity of investment projects, reduces the sensitivity of lending to monetary
policy shocks. In particular, we focus on the balance sheet transmission mechanism of
monetary policy. According to this channel, changes in the nominal rate affect the net
present value of the borrower’s debt obligations and hence his net worth; through various
6The following quotes witness the emergence of such a view:
“The financial system should serve the real economy, not the other way around”.
(Mario Draghi, ECB Chairman, “Les de´fis de la compe´titivite´”, Paris, 13 March 2012)
“We would be much poorer without a functioning financial system, and the flow of credit and
equity purchases that it permits.[...] But those needs were being taken care of a quarter-century
ago, and well before that. The real question [...], is whether anything much was added to the
system’s ability to allocate capital efficiently by the advent of naked CDSs and CDOs and the
rest of the alphabet. No blanket answer is possible.” (Robert Solow, Hedging America, The
New Republics, January 2010).
While this view is somewhat “normative”, we will take here an entirely “positive” perspective.
7We also investigate the relation between our measure and the share of finance in U.S. GDP reported by
Philippon (2012). While they capture very different concepts, we interestingly find a very high correlation
between a series equal to one minus our measure of connectedness and the share of finance in non-defence
U.S. value added.
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contractual frictions, the change in net worth influences the expected return to lending (for
more on this transmission mechanism, see Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). We show that
this transmission mechanism is mitigated as investment projects become more liquid. The
key to this result is as follows: absent an inter-bank market for investment projects, banks
face a tradeoff between investment and liquidity. Consequently, changes in the expected
return to investment (for example, through changes in the net worth of the borrower) may
change the tradeoff between investment and liquidity, thus affecting the equilibrium amount
of investment. In the presence of a liquid inter-bank market for investment projects, there
is effectively no tradeoff between investment and liquidity: since all projects have positive
net present values (NPV), all projects are implemented, regardless of small changes in their
NPV induced by changes in monetary policy.
Finally, we interact our aggregate measure of connectedness with a structural vector
auto-regression (VAR) for the U.S. economy, and produce impulse responses to a monetary
policy shock conditional on different levels of connection. We check the robustness of our
results also using a Factor-Augmented VAR (FAVAR) model. We find that the responses of
the real variables to a monetary policy shocks are dampened as the level of the connection
between the financial sector and the real economy decreases.
This paper is linked to several strands of the literature. First, it is related to the litera-
ture dealing with measurement of financial intermediation and its characteristics. Philippon
(2012) provides evidence on the quantitative importance and the cost of financial interme-
diation in the U.S. in the last 130 years. Greenwood and Scharfstein (2013) analyze the
growth of the share of finance on gdp in the U.S. while Philippon and Reshef (2013) analyze
the growth of the share of finance for several developed countries. Philippon and Reshef
(forthcoming) propose evidence on the evolution of the wages in the financial industry for
the period 1909-2006.8
Second, and closer to our spirit, this paper is related to the analysis of the relation
between financial firms and the real economy. Mesonnier and Stevanovic (2012) use micro-
level financial data to construct an aggregate leverage shock and explore its implication
8See also the survey on Financial Intermediation by Gordon and Winton (2003).
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for the real variables. Diebold and Yilmaz (2012, 2013) measure the connectedness within
financial firms and its contribution to shock transmission. Brunnermeier et al. (2012) analyze
the banks’ non interest income and how this affects their contribution to systemic risk.
Hahm, Shin and Shin (forthcoming) analyze the non-core liabilities of Korean banks and
their implications for financial vulnerability.9 We see this paper as complementary to that
line of research, since we focus our attention on the composition of assets. Our Measure
of Connectedness, in fact, could be interpreted as a measure of the core assets of financial
institutions.
Finally, the paper is related to the literature on the monetary policy transmission mech-
anism. Boivin and Giannoni (2006) report evidence that the effects of monetary policy
shocks on real variables are muted in the post 1980 period, and show how this finding can be
explained by an increase in the effectiveness of monetary policy. Adrian and Shin (2011b)
consider the role of financial intermediaries in monetary economics. Boivin et al (2011)
report FAVAR evidence as well as evidence from DSGE modeling on the change over time
of the monetary transmission mechanism. Confirming the results by Boivin and Giannoni
(2006), they also find muted responses of real variables to monetary policy innovations in
more recent times, and argue that this is mostly accounted for by changes in policy behavior
and the effect of these changes on expectations.10 Closer to our spirit, Dynan et al. (2006)
present evidence of the reduced responsiveness of several economic aggregates to shocks,
dividing the sample before and after important regulatory changes. We contribute to this
literature by providing a measure that can capture the structural transformation underwent
by the U.S. financial sector and propose a model that rationalizes the decreased sensitivity
of real activity to monetary policy due to this structural transformation.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce our measure of connectedness
between the financial sector and the real economy and document its evolution in the U.S.
In Section 3 we outline our stylized theoretical model. In Section 4 we show some empirical
9See also the discussion of non-core liabilities contained in Adrian and Shin (2011a)
10See also Canova and Gambetti (2009), Clarida et al. (2000), Cogley and Sargent (2005), Kim et al.
(1999), Primiceri (2005), Sims and Zha (2006), Sellon (2002) and Stock and Watson (2002).
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evidence consistent with the theory. Section 5 concludes with several suggestions for future
research.
2 The measure of connectedness
Our proposed measure of the connection of a financial sector (or a financial institution) to
the real economy is based on the composition of its assets. While the exact formula depends
on the type of financial institution analyzed, the Measure of Connectedness is conceptually
the share of the credit market instruments represented by claims whose direct counterparts
belong to the non-financial sectors (households, non-financial firms and government):
CONNit =
CREDIT REALit
CREDITit
(1)
where CREDITit represents the total amount of credit market instruments of a given insti-
tution i at time t, while CREDIT REALit represents the credit market instruments whose
direct counterparts are households (i.e. mortgages and consumer loans), non-financial firms
(i.e. commercial loans) or the government (i.e. treasuries). Such a measure can be computed
for each player in the U.S. financial system using data from the Flows of Funds.
Probably the most important drawback of using flow of funds data is that we are not
able to say much about non-balance sheet items, such as derivatives. Since derivatives are
typically used as the main example of the disconnectedness between the financial sector and
the real economy, we are aware that we are missing an important piece of information, and
we therefore consider our results suggestive of an upper-bound to the level of connectedness.
However, an advantage of using flow of funds data is that the measure can be computed for a
long time series and hypothetically for different financial systems. Moreover, a conceptually
similar measure could be computed also for a single financial institution using balance sheet
data.
We stress that we try to measure the share of credit market instruments whose direct
counterparts are in the non-financial sector. As many commentators observed, the transfor-
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mation of the financial intermediation process from the “traditional” banking model to the
“originate and distribute” model produced a lengthening of the chain linking the ultimate
lender to the ultimate borrower (Adrian and Shin, 2011a). This lengthening may have had
several consequences, including the erosion of lending standards (Keys et al, 2010), which
likely played an important role in the crisis that started in 2007.11
In what follows we describe the construction of the measure for each element of the U.S.
financial system for the period 1952Q1-2009Q4.12 We use data from the release Z1 of March
8, 2012. A Data Appendix contains detail on the composition of the measure for different
players within the financial system.
Traditional financial institutions. Traditional financial institutions include Commercial
Banks, Savings Institutions and Credit Unions. For commercial banks, at the numerator of
our measure we use the sum of Open Market Papers, Treasury Securities, Non-securitized
GSE-backed securities, Municipal securities, Non-securitized Corporate Bonds, Bank Loans,
Mortgages, Security Credit and Consumer Credit. At the denominator, the total amount
of credit market instruments13. For Savings Institutions, we use a similar measure.14 For
Credit Unions, the Flows of Funds table does not distinguish between securitized and not-
securitized bonds. By including all bonds in the numerator of our measure, once again we
are conservative and we accept the risk of over-estimating the connectedness with the real
economy.
Figure 2 reports the results obtained for the measure of connectedness of the traditional
players. All the three indicators are falling over time, from values very close to 1 to values
between 0.77 (for the Credit Unions) and 0.84 (Commercial Banks).
11Moreover, this lengthening of the credit chain might have increase the vulnerability of the system to
sudden drop in trust, which arguably was an important element in explaining the freeze of credit markets in
the fall of 2008. See Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2012) for an example of a model where trust between
actors play an important role in the intermediation process.
12A change in the accounting rule governing the GSE at the beginning of 2010 would introduce a spurious
element in our calculations.
13Flow of Funds series FL.724.005.005, table L.110
14See appendix for details.
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Insurances, Mutual Funds and Pension Funds. As in the case of Credit Unions, in
the case of Insurances, Pension Funds and Mutual Funds, the tables in the Flow of Funds
do not distinguish between asset backed securities and other corporate bonds. Once again,
the results need to be interpreted as an upper bound for the connection.
Insurances Companies can be divided into Property-Casualty Insurance Companies and
Life Insurance Companies. As for the Mutual Funds, we only consider the two most impor-
tant categories: Mutual Funds and Money Market Mutual Funds (MMMF). Figure 3 reports
the results we obtain. Property and Life Insurances appear to remain fairly connected to the
real economy all along the period considered. In contrast, we witness a more pronounced
increase in the disconnectedness in the case of mutual funds. Interestingly, the reduction in
the connectedness of the MMMF seems to start later, but to have a large drop in the years
preceding the crisis, where the MMMF balance sheet were increasingly filled with complex
securities like mortgage backed securities (MBS).
Figure 4 shows the evolution of the connectedness over time of Pension Funds. We analyze
separately private pension funds, local government pension funds, and federal government
pension funds. Here the results are starkly different. While private pension funds appear to
have become much more disconnected over time from the real economy (starting from the
seventies), the federal government pension funds barely changed, while the local government
pension funds started becoming more disconnected during the nineties.
Shadow Banking. We consider the connectedness of Government Sponsored Enterprises
(GSEs), Brokers and Dealers, Finance Companies and ABS issuers. Finance companies are
fully connected to the real economy, and hence we assign a value of 1 to their measure
of connectedness. Figure 5 shows our results for the other actors within shadow banking.
Not surprisingly, the Brokers and Dealers appear to be fairly disconnected from the real
economy ever since they appear in the eighties. Even more so is the case for the ABS
issuers.15 More surprising is probably the evolution of the connectedness of the GSEs, who
15The big drop observed in the series is due to the fact that in the first observation available for ABS
issuers in the Flow of Funds (1983q2) the only asset class recorded is trade credit. We consider trade credit
as being part of the credit to the real economy, hence the Measure of Connectedness of ABS issuers for that
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display a downward trend in the nineties.
We exclude from the analysis the Agency and GSE-backed mortgage pools. The reason
is to avoid double counting.16
Aggregate Measure. In order to have an aggregate picture of the connectedness of the
U.S. financial system to the real economy, we take a weighted average of each measure of
connectedness, weighting each actor by its time-varying share of credit market instruments:
CONNUS,t =
∑
i
ωi,t ∗ CONNi,t (2)
where ωi,t =
CREDITi,t
CREDITUS,t
and i = {CB, SI, CU, PI, LI,MF, PF,GSE,BRO,FIN,ABS}
Figure 6 reports the result. As the figure shows, the aggregate drop in connectedness is
of the order of 27% during the period 1952-2009. It is interesting to notice how the aggregate
result we obtain for the measure of connectedness is, to a certain extent, due to a composition
effect. Figure 7 shows the shares of credit market instruments held by the different types of
financial institutions. Similarly to Figure 1, the shadow banking share increased greatly in
the last thirty years, while the share of the traditional players dropped significantly. Figure
8 reports the results on the share of credit market instruments for two particularly relevant
players: commercial banks and ABS issuers. As the figure shows, the drop in the share of
credit market instruments held by commercial banks is coupled with an important increase
in the share of the ABS issuers, which then dropped substantially during the crisis.
It is also interesting to note how our measure of connectedness shows some relation with
key moments in the history of the deregulation of the U.S. financial system. The measure has
a clear change in trend in the early eighties, when several deregulation acts were promoted in
the U.S.17. Moreover, the aggregate easure of connectedness seems to accelerate its downward
quarter is equal to one.
16The Agency and GSE backed securities, in fact, are among the assets that we consider to contribute
to the disconnectedness of all the other players in the financial system. An alternative treatment would
have been to include this category and assign arbitrarily to this actor a level of connection equal to zero by
definition. Once again, we have been conservative and decided to present an upper bound estimate of the
level of connection.
17For Instance the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act in 1980 and the Garn-
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trend for few years, starting in 1999. The Financial Modernization Act, also known as the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, passed in 1999, repealed the Glass-Steagall of 1933 and removed
the separation between the activities of commercial banking and investment banking, thus
spurring a wave of mergers and acquisitions in the U.S. financial sector and leading to a
transformation of the business model in several U.S. financial institutions.
Measure of connectedness and the share of finance in GDP. It is instructive to
investigate the relation between our measure of connectedness and the share of finance in
GDP, constructed by Philippon (2012). In Figure 9, we report both a series equal to one mi-
nus our measure of connectedness, which is a measure of disconnection between the financial
sector and the real economy, and the share of finance in non-defence value added18 .
While the two series are conceptually different, they are interestingly highly correlated.19
Our measure of connectedness is a way of representing the structural transformation that
affected the U.S. financial system in the last fifty years. Philippon (2012) measures the
share of finance in U.S. GDP. One could conjecture that the structural transformation of the
U.S. financial sector captured by our measure might have contributed to a reallocation of
resources towards finance, thus implying a greater share of finance in GDP. However other
factors, such as a sector-specific technological change or the increasing trend toward financial
globalization, might also help explaining Philippon’s findings. 20
Since this paper focuses mainly on the implications for monetary policy of the structural
transformation that affected the U.S. financial system, we focus in what follows on our
measure of connectedness, without taking a strong stance on its contribution to the increase
in the share of finance in GDP.
St Germain Depository Institutions Act, in 1982.
18While Philippon’s data are at annual frequency, we interpolated them to transform them into a quarterly
series.
19The correlation between the two series is 0.98.
20Another recent explanation of Philippon’s results can be found in Gennaioli, Shleifer and Vishny (2013),
who propose a Solow-type growth model augmented with a financial intermediation process featuring a
role for trust. In their model, the share of finance over GDP grows over time due to the role of financial
intermediation as a tool for wealth management in an environment where the ratio of wealth to GDP grows
as the economy approaches its steady state.
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3 Connectedness and monetary policy: theory
We present a stylized model that captures a possible relationship between the connectedness
of the financial sector and the sensitivity of real activity to monetary policy. We focus on
the credit channel of transmission of monetary policy, and show how a financial sector more
disconnected from the real economy implies a lower sensitivity of lending to interest rate
changes.
The basic environment is similar to Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Allen and Gale
(2000), with some ex-ante uncertainty. There are three periods, t = 0, 1, 2. At time 0, a
continuum of banks are endowed with 1 unit of deposits (deposits here are time 0 goods).
At that time, a fraction q0 of banks are also endowed with an investment opportunity: an
investment of I units of deposits at t = 0 (where 0 ≤ I ≤ 1) yields a return of AIα at
t = 2. An investment opportunity can be seen as a request of a loan by an entrepreneur.
The parameter A is the recoverable part of output, which in principle changes with the
entrepreneur’s net worth. In the background, we can think of an entrepreneur with some
initial debt obligations, and some net worth (N). The parameter A depends on his net
worth N and therefore is decreasing with the NPV of his debt obligations (decreasing in
r, the interest rate set by the monetary authority).21 We assume that any enforceability
problems are already summarized in A, the recoverable part of output. The banks observe
the realization of A before making their lending decision.
In the background, there is a transmission mechanism of monetary policy: A is increasing
in the net worth of the entrepreneur N , and N is decreasing in r. We thus focus on the
balance sheet channel, as described by Bernanke and Gertler (1995).
All banks - those who receive an investment opportunity and those who don’t - have
access to a storage technology, that transforms one unit of output at time t to one unit
of output in time t + 1. For banks without an investment opportunity, this is the only
technology. Banks with an investment opportunity choose between saving in storage and
21We do not take a strong stance on the reason why A might depend on the net worth of the entrepreneur.
A possible interpretation is that the entrepreneur puts more effort if his net worth is higher.
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investing.
The bank’s time 0 objective function is:
E(θc1 + c2) (3)
Where c1 is consumption goods at time 1 and c2 is consumption goods at time 2. The
parameter θ is a liquidity shock, that takes value θ¯ > 1 with probability q and value θ = 1
with probability 1 − q. A realization of θ = θ¯ > 1 can be thought of as whatever might
induce banks to prefer liquidity at time 1 as opposed to time 2.
We first solve the model under the assumption that there is no interbank market. Given
our definition of connectedness, this is equivalent to a situation of full connectedness, as the
banks only deal with entrepreneurs. We will then allow for the possibility of an interbank
market that can be thought of as a partially connected environment. It is useful to keep in
mind, given our definitions, that a greater disconnectedness between the financial sector and
the real economy implies a greater interconnectedness within the financial sector.
The fully connected environment. Absent trade between banks, banks choose the
amount of storage and investment to maximize their objective function. For banks that do
not have an investment opportunity, the problem is trivial: they will store all deposits; if,
at period 1, they find that θ = θ¯, they will consume all goods at t = 1. Otherwise, they are
indifferent between time 1 and time 2 consumption.
For banks with an investment opportunity, the bank’s problem can be written as:
max
I∈[0,1]
E(θc1 + c2) (4)
s.t.
c1 = 1− I (5)
c2 = AI
α (6)
Note that, if θ = θ¯, the bank strictly prefers to consume its storage rather than to store it
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for period t = 2. If θ = 1, the bank is indifferent between the two options, so we can assume
without loss of generality that it consumes all stored goods at time t = 1. Substituting in
the constraints, the problem amounts to:
max
I∈[0,1]
E(θ(1− I) + AIα) (7)
Assuming an interior solution, the first order condition is:
E(θ) = αAIα−1 ⇒ I1−α = α
E(θ)
A⇒ I = ( α
E(θ)
A)
1
1−α (8)
Note that equation (6) admits an interior solution only if E(θ) > αA. In other words,
if the expected valuation of liquidity at t = 1 is sufficiently high, it is optimal for the bank
to store some deposits. Assuming that this parametric restriction is satisfied, the interior
solution is increasing in A, so there is some transmission of monetary policy (that changes
A(N)). In contrast, at the corner solution small changes in A (or in N , or in r) would
not change the bank’s investment decision, and there would be no sensitivity to monetary
shocks.
Formally, we define the sensitivity of real activity with respect to monetary policy in
this model to be the semi-elasticity of aggregate investment to interest rate changes. We
decompose this semi-elasticity as follows:
∂lnI
∂r
=
∂lnI
∂A
∂A
∂N
∂N
∂r
(9)
We assume the second term to be positive and the third term to be negative. Then, from
equation (6), we get:
∂ln(IAGGc )
∂A
=
∂
∂A
( α
E(θ)
A)
1
1−α
( α
E(θ)
A)
1
1−α
(10)
where IAGGc is the aggregate investment in the fully connected environment.
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The partially connected environment. Assume next that a fraction λ of investment
opportunities are tradable at time t = 1. This is a very reduced form way of introducing
securitization in the model. The securitization is the process through which an illiquid asset
can be sold by the bank to a special investment vehicle (SIV). The SIV transform the illiquid
asset into securities, by issuing bonds with stratified risk profiles. The banks, at time t = 0,
know whether their investment opportunity (if any) is tradable (liquid)or not.
If there are enough banks with θ = 1 who hold stored goods, the price of time 2 goods in
terms of time 1 goods is 1.22 In this case, banks holding tradable projects who realize θ = θ¯
can sell their investments at time t = 1 at no loss. We treat λ as a proxy for the extent
of the possible interconnectedness within the financial system, and thus as a measure of
the disconnectedness between the financial sector and the real economy. The maximization
problem of a bank that has a non-tradable project is the same as in the fully connected
environment. For banks with a tradable project, the ability to sell the project at t = 1
increases the returns to investment. Since banks always weakly prefer to consume at time
t = 1, their maximization problem can be written as if they only consume at time 1:
max
I∈[0,1]
E(θ(1− I + AIα)) (11)
The FOC with respect to I is:
αAIα−1 = 1⇒ I1−α = αA (12)
For αA > 1, there is no interior solution. We will assume that this is the case. To summarize,
22For this to be the case, we need to assume enough “liquid demand” for these assets. Formally, a sufficient
condition for this to hold for every λ is (1 − p)(1 − q) > q0qA. The left hand side is the amount of storage
goods in the hand of θ = 1 banks who did not receive an investment opportunity at time 0. These banks
hold storage goods, and are indifferent between time 1 goods and time 2 goods. The right hand side is the
value of investment opportunities in the hand of banks who had an investment opportunity, and received a
liquidity shock that made it optimal for them to sell at t = 1 (given I = 1, each project promises AIα = A
units of time 2 goods). We assume this is the case, in order to capture the large demand for securitized
assets prevailing in the financial markets, especially before 2007.
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we are making the following parametric restriction:
E(θ) > αA > 1 (13)
Given this assumption, banks with tradable investment projects have a corner solution, in
which they invest the maximum amount I = 1. Intuitively, there is no liquidity advantage
to storage if the investment project is tradable. Given a corner solution I = 1, the amount
of investment does not respond to small changes in A or in r - investment in these banks is
unresponsive to monetary policy.
At the aggregate level, note that investment is now given by:
IAGGd = λ+ (1− λ)(
α
E(θ)
A)
1
1−α (14)
The sensitivity to monetary policy is given by:
∂ ln(IAGGd )
∂A
=
(1− λ) ∂
∂A
( α
E(θ)
A)
1
1−α
λ+ (1− λ)( α
E(θ)
A)
1
1−α
(15)
Note that λ = 0 corresponds to the fully connected case. The absolute value of the above
expression is decreasing in λ. To see this, note that the absolute value of this expression is
of the form (1−λ)a
(1−λ)b+λ where a > 0 and b < 1. The derivative with respect to λ is:
−a((1− λ)b+ λ)− (1− b)(1− λ)a
((1− λ)b+ λ)2 < 0 (16)
This result implies that that the sensitivity of aggregate investment to monetary policy
is increasing in connectedness. Note that, in this model, our measure of connectedness
corresponds to the share of claims at t = 1 for which the direct counterpart is investment
projects. The “disconnected” part is claims held by banks on investment projects initiated
by other banks.23 The equilibrium level of connectedness is given by:
23Instead of “purchasing” the investment projects directly, we can think of the interbank market more
realistically as a loan market, in which banks with tradable investment projects borrow against t = 2
15
CONN(λ) =
I(λ)
λq0q + I(λ)
(17)
It is easy to verify that this expression is decreasing in λ.
Moreover, from equation (12), the aggregate amount of lending is increasing in λ (
∂IAGGd
∂λ
>
0). Intuitively, securitization makes lenders less careful about investing in illiquid assets if
they can be sold in case of need at time t = 1.
Altunbas, Gambacorta and Marquez-Ibanez (2009), using detailed information on secu-
ritization activities for a sample of European banks, find both that securitization shelters
banks’ loans from the effect of monetary policy and that it strengthens the capacity of banks
to supply loans. Both results hold in the simple model we presented in this section.
4 Connectedness and monetary policy: evidence
This section presents some time series evidence to explore how connectedness affects the
responses of economic variables to monetary policy shocks. We follow both a structural
VAR (SVAR) approach as well as a factor-augmented VAR (FAVAR).
SVAR. We adapt the approach of Boivin and Giannoni (2006) by including our measure
of connectedness as an exogenous variable.24 The model can be written as follows:
Yt = Φ(L)Yt−1 + βCONNt−1Yt−1 + et (18)
where Yt is a K×1 vector of endogenous variable, Φ(L) is a matrix polynomial of order p and
CONNt−1 is exogenous. The reduced form errors, et, are assumed to be linear combinations
of structural shocks, εt:
investment income. Here, “tradable” has the interpretation of “collateralizable”.
24While arguably also the connection might be an endogenous variable, the result obtained in figure 6
indicates how the movements in the connection are long-run smooth movements, and thus we believe it
can be considered an exogenous when using business cycle frequency data. In addition, the connection is
included with lag one.
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et = Hεt
with E(εtε
′
t) = Σ, a diagonal matrix.
It is easy to see that the impulse responses to any shock in εt will depend on CONNt−1.
Without loss of generality, assume p = 2 and develop Φ(L):
Yt = Φ1Yt−1 + Φ2Yt−2 + βCONNt−1Yt−1 + et
= (Φ1 + βCONNt−1)Yt−1 + Φ2Yt−2 + et
= Φ1,t−1Yt−1 + Φ2Yt−2 + et,
where Φ1,t−1 = (Φ1 + βCONNt−1). Hence, the impulse response functions (IRFs) are ob-
tained for any level of CONNt−1 by inverting the previous expression:
Yt =
[
I− Φ1,t−1L− Φ2L2
]−1
Hεt. (19)
In practice, the coefficients matrices Φ(L) and β are estimated by OLS regression on
(18), and H is deduced by imposing enough identification restrictions. The IRFs are then
easily computed using (19). The confidence bands can be constructed using a parametric
bootstrap. 25 Following Boivin and Giannoni (2006), Yt contains the deviation of the natural
logarithm of quarterly real GDP (GDPQ) from a linear deterministic trend, the annualized
rate of change in the quarterly GDP deflator (GDPD), the natural logarithm of the quarterly
average of the monthly spot market commodity price index (PSCCOM) and the quarterly
25We use the following procedure:
1. Shuﬄe the time dimension of OLS residuals eˆt and get bootstrap innovations e
∗
t
2. Using [Y1, . . . , Yp] as initial values and CONNt−1, get the bootstrap endogenous variables from
Y ∗t = Φˆ(L)Y
∗
t−1 + βˆCONNt−1Y
∗
t−1 + e
∗
t .
3. Impose the identification restrictions to get H and calculate impulse responses.
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average of the Federal Funds Rate (FFR). The exogenous variable CONNt−1 contains our
aggregate Measure of Connectedness. The data ranges from 1959Q1 to 2009Q1.
Four lags are included in the VAR. The identification of structural shocks is achieved by
the following recursive ordering: [ PSCCOM, GDPQ, GDPD, FFR ]. Hence, the unexpected
monetary policy shock is ordered last in εt. The rotation matrix H is obtained using Choleski
decomposition of the covariance matrix of eˆt. The 95% confidence intervals are computed
using 1000 bootstrap replications.
In Figure (10), we compare the impulse responses of elements in Yt to an adverse monetary
policy shock when the Measure of Connectedness is high and low, respectively CONN = 0.98
and CONN = 0.82. These are the average values of our connectedness measures for the
periods 1959Q1-1983Q4 and 1984Q1-2009Q1. The impulse response with confidence bands
for each level of connectedness are presented in Figures (11) and (12).
As we can see from Figure (10), at the level of connection of 0.98 the adverse monetary
shock generates a decrease in output, which exhibit a hump-shaped response. The price level
decreases too, but only after few quarters (the well known price puzzle phenomenon). When
we consider a level of connection of 0.82, instead, we see that the response of the GDP to the
same monetary policy shock is now not statistically different from zero. Also the response
of the quarterly GDP deflator and the spot market commodity price index are muted at the
lower level of connection. Interestingly, there is no evidence of price puzzle in that case.
In order to assess whether the difference in the impulse response we obtained under
different levels of connection is statistically significant, we plot the difference in figure (13),
and we include confidence intervals at 90% significance level. As the figure shows, the impulse
responses of GDP and GDP deflator are statistically different under the two scenarios, while
the impulse responses of the commodity price index and the federal funds rate are not
statistically significantly different.
The results reported in Figure (13) are robust to the inclusion of a time trend in the
model, as well as to a different specification of the lag structure.26
26We omitted the results here, they are available upon request.
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FAVAR. We conduct a more refined exercise inspired by the model from Bernanke et
al.(2005). In contrast to standard structural VAR models, factor models have a number
of advantages: i) they allow considering large amounts of information potentially observed
by agents, and thus minimize the risk of omitted variable bias; ii) they are not sensitive to
the choice of a specific data series, which may be arbitrary; iii) they are less likely to be
subject to non-fundamentalness issues raised by Forni et al. (2009)27; and iv) they allow us
to compute the response of a larger set of variables of interest to identified shocks.
As in the case of SVAR, we introduce our measure of connectedness through interaction
terms, in order to obtain impulse response functions that are conditional on a certain level
of connectedness.
We report the technical details in the appendix, while here we present only our main
results.
As before, we compare the impulse responses to an adverse monetary policy shock when
the connectedness is high and low, respectively CONN = 0.98 and CONN = 0.82. In figure
(14) we report the responses of output, investment and employment to an identified monetary
policy shock. In all three cases, the responses of real variables to a monetary innovation
are muted at lower levels of connectedness. In order to test whether these differences are
statistically significant, we compute the difference between the impulse responses and we
compute via bootstrap a 90% confidence internal. In figure (15) we report the results. The
impulse responses of GDP, Investment and Employment are statistically different, at least
in the first few quarters.
In figure (16) we report the results for CPI inflation, bank lending and loans and leases.
Interestingly, also the response of bank lending and loans and lease are muted in the case of
a lower connection between the financial sector and the real economy. This is precisely the
mechanism that we highlighted in the previous section. As before, we check the statistical
significance of these results by plotting the difference of the impulse responses and the
27If the shocks in the VAR model are fundamental, then the dynamic effects implied by the moving average
representation can have a meaningful interpretation, i.e. the structural shocks can be recovered from current
and past values of observable series. Forni et al. (2009) argue that while non-fundamentalness is generic of
small scale models, it is highly unlikely to arise in large dimensional dynamic factor models.
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associated confidence intervals. We show the results in figure (17).
We conclude that the inclusion of our measure of connectedness into a SVAR or a FAVAR
for the U.S. economy is able to generate different responses of real variables to monetary
policy innovations.
5 Conclusions
This paper documents a declining trend in the share of financial claims whose direct counter-
part is in the non-financial sector. The financial sector’s increased ability to buffer idiosyn-
cratic liquidity shocks may have contributed to an increase in investment, and a decrease
in the sensitivity of investment to fundamentals such as the borrower’s net worth. In this
paper, we illustrate how this may have contributed to the dampening of the responsiveness to
monetary policy. However, the implications of this structural change in the financial system
may have had implications far beyond this. We outline here several potential avenues for
future research that make use of the measure of connectedness.
First, it would be interesting to develop a quantitative macroeconomic model embedding
the concept of connection explored in this paper. This could also be used to evaluate the
relative importance of the policy behavior and the disconnectedness in explaining the muted
responses of monetary policy innovations on economic variables found using more recent
samples.
Second, it would be interesting to explore whether the connection between the financial
sector and the real economy affects other dimensions of the macro economy (for example,
the availability of credit to firms or the vulnerability to financial crisis).
Third, it may be insightful to analyze the dynamics of the connection between the fi-
nancial sector and the real economy for additional countries, and study how connection was
related to performance during the Great Recession. In this sense, it would be interesting
also to address “normative” questions, such as the effects of connectedness on welfare.
Finally, and especially for policy purposes, it would be important to go beyond the
aggregate perspective we take in this paper and use balance sheet data on single financial
20
institutions to analyze the impact of their connection with the real economy on a range
of performance measures. This could also help improve the regulation and monitoring of
financial institutions. We plan to pursue these avenues in our future research.
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A Appendix
A.1 Measure of Connectedness
The following table report the exact composition of the numerator of Measure of Connect-
edness for each U.S. financial actor. At the denominator, we always used the total credit
market instruments.
U.S. Financial Actor CREDIT REAL
Commercial Banks Open Market Papers, Treasury Securities, Non-securitized GSE-backed securities, Municipal securities
Non-securitized Corporate Bonds, Bank Loans, Mortgages, Security Credit and Consumer Credit
Savings Institutions Open Market Papers, Treasury Securities, Non-securitized GSE-backed securities, Municipal securities,
Non-securitized Corporate Bonds, Mortgages, and Consumer Credit
Credit Unions Open Market Papers, Treasury Securities, Corporate Bonds, Home Mortgages, and Consumer Credit
Property Ins Comp Open Market Papers, Treasury Securities, Municipal Securities, Mortgages and Corporate Bonds
Life Ins Comp Open Market Papers, Treasury Securities, Municipal Securities, Mortgages and Corporate Bonds
Mutual Funds Open Market Papers, Treasury Securities, Municipal Securities, Corporate Bonds and other loans
MMMF Open Market Papers, Treasury Securities, Municipal Securities, Corporate Bonds and other loans
Private Pension funds Open Market Papers, Treasury Securities, Municipal Securities, Corporate Bonds and other loans
Local Govt pension funds Open Market Papers, Treasury Securities, Municipal Securities, Corporate Bonds and other loans
Federal Govt pension funds Open Market Papers, Treasury Securities, Municipal Securities, Corporate Bonds and other loans
GSEs Open Market Papers, Treasury Securities, Municipal Securities, Corporate Bonds and Mortgages
Brokers and Dealers Open Market Papers, Municipal Securities and Corporate Bonds
ABS issuers Treasury Securities, Consumer Credit and Trade Credit
A.2 FAVAR
We give here some details about the FAVAR model we used in Section 4. Consider the
following static factor model with latent and observed factors:
Xt = Λ
FFt + Λ
RRt + ut (20) Ft
Rt
 = Φ(L)
 Ft−1
Rt−1
+ βCONNt−1
 Ft−1
Rt−1
+ et (21)
where Ft is vector of K latent factors and Rt is the observed factor. In our case, Rt is the
the Federal Funds Rate, since the objective here is to identify the monetary policy shock. Xt
contains N macroeconomic and financial indicators organized into a block of ‘slow-moving’
variables that are largely predetermined to monetary policy, and another consisting of ‘fast
moving’ variables that are sensitive to the FED’s rule. The idiosyncratic errors are assumed
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to be serially uncorrelated.
In our application, Xt contains N = 108 quarterly time series from Ng and Stevanovic
(2012), that run from 1959Q1 to 2009Q1. The data have been transformed to induce sta-
tionarity and are standardized prior to estimation28. The ICp2 information criteria from Bai
and Ng (2002) suggests K = 3 latent factors. The lag order of Φ(L) is set to 4.
The estimation and identification of structural shocks consist of several steps. First,
one must impose Rt as an observed factor when estimating Ft. Let Cˆ(Ft, Rt) be the K
principal components of Xt. Let X
S
t be NS ‘slow’ moving variables, and let the K principal
components of XSt be C
?(Ft). The estimate of latent factors is Fˆt = Cˆ(Ft, Rt)− bˆRRt where
bˆR is obtained by least squares estimation of the regression
Cˆ(Ft, Rt) = bCC
?(Ft) + bRRt + ut.
The estimation of the loadings is now straightforward by regressing Xt on Fˆt and Rt: ΛˆF
and ΛˆR.
Second, using Fˆt, we estimate (21) as in the case of SVAR model. Since Fˆt can be
correlated with Rt, we identify the monetary policy by ordering Rt last. Finally, we invert
(21) to obtain factors’ impulse responses, and multiply them by factor loadings to get the
IRFs of any element in Xt.
The results for a subset of series in Xt are presented in Figures (14) and (16).
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A.2.1 Data Used in the FAVAR
The transformation codes are: 1 no transformation; 2 first difference; 4 logarithm; 5 first
difference of logarithm; 0 variable not used in the estimation (only used for transforming
other variables). A * indicates a series that is deflated with the GDP deflator (series #89).
No. Series Code T-Code Series Description
1 DRIINTL:GDPRC@US.Q 5 NIA REAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (CHAINED-2000), SA - U.S.
2 USCEN:GDPGDR.Q 5 REAL GDP-GDS,BILLIONS OF CH (2000) $,SAAR-US
3 USCEN:GDPSVR.Q 5 REAL GDP-SVC,BILLIONS OF CH (2000) $,SAAR-US
28The complete description of the data and their transformation is presented below.
29All the other variables are available upon request.
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4 USCEN:GDPSR.Q 5 REAL GDP-STRUC,BILLIONS OF CH (2000) $,SAAR-US
5 BASIC:IPN11.M 5 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION INDEX - PRODUCTS, TOTAL
6 BASIC:IPN300.M 5 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION INDEX - FINAL PRODUCTS
7 BASIC:IPN12.M 5 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION INDEX - CONSUMER GOODS
8 BASIC:IPN13.M 5 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION INDEX - DURABLE CONSUMER GOODS
9 BASIC:IPN18.M 5 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION INDEX - NONDURABLE CONSUMER GOODS
10 BASIC:IPN25.M 5 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION INDEX - BUSINESS EQUIPMENT
11 BASIC:IPN32.M 5 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION INDEX - MATERIALS
12 BASIC:IPN34.M 5 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION INDEX - DURABLE GOODS MATERIALS
13 BASIC:IPN38.M 5 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION INDEX - NONDURABLE GOODS MATERIALS
14 BASIC:IPN10.M 5 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION INDEX - TOTAL INDEX
15 USCEN:UTLB00004.M 1 CAPACITY UTILIZ-MFG,SA-US
16 BASIC:PMI.M 1 PURCHASING MANAGERS’ INDEX (SA)
17 BASIC:PMP.M 1 NAPM PRODUCTION INDEX (PERCENT)
18 DRIINTL:WS@US.Q 5* NIA NOMINAL TOTAL COMPENSATION OF EMPLOYEES, SA - U.S.
19 USCEN:YPR.M 5 PERS INCOME CH 2000 $,SA-US
20 USCEN:YP@V00C.M 5 PERS INCOME LESS TRSF PMT CH 2000 $,SA-US
21 USCEN:AHPMF.M 5* AHE,PROD WORKERS: MFG,SA-US
22 USCEN:AHPCON.M 5* AHE,PROD WORKERS: CONSTR,SA-US
23 USCEN:HPMF.M 5 AWH,PROD WORKERS: MFG,SA-US
24 USCEN:HOPMD.M 5 AVG WEEKLY OT,PROD WORKERS: DUR,SA-US
25 BASIC:LHEL.M 5 INDEX OF HELP-WANTED ADVERTISING IN NEWSPAPERS (1967=100;SA)
26 BASIC:LHELX.M 1 EMPLOYMENT: RATIO; HELP-WANTED ADS:NO. UNEMPLOYED CLF
27 BASIC:LHEM.M 5 CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE: EMPLOYED, TOTAL (THOUS.,SA)
28 BASIC:LHNAG.M 5 CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE: EMPLOYED, NONAGRIC.INDUSTRIES (THOUS.,SA)
29 BASIC:LHUR.M 1 UNEMPLOYMENT RATE: ALL WORKERS, 16 YEARS & OVER (%,SA)
30 BASIC:LHU680.M 1 UNEMPLOY.BY DURATION: AVERAGE(MEAN)DURATION IN WEEKS (SA)
31 BASIC:LHU5.M 5 UNEMPLOY.BY DURATION: PERSONS UNEMPL.LESS THAN 5 WKS (THOUS.,SA)
32 BASIC:LHU14.M 5 UNEMPLOY.BY DURATION: PERSONS UNEMPL.5 TO 14 WKS (THOUS.,SA)
33 BASIC:LHU15.M 5 UNEMPLOY.BY DURATION: PERSONS UNEMPL.15 WKS + (THOUS.,SA)
34 BASIC:LHU26.M 5 UNEMPLOY.BY DURATION: PERSONS UNEMPL.15 TO 26 WKS (THOUS.,SA)
35 BASIC:CES001.M 5 EMPLOYEES, NONFARM - TOTAL NONFARM
36 BASIC:CES002.M 5 EMPLOYEES, NONFARM - TOTAL PRIVATE
37 BASIC:CES003.M 5 EMPLOYEES, NONFARM - GOODS-PRODUCING
38 USCEN:CR.Q 5 REAL PCE,BILLIONS OF CH (2000) $,SAAR-US
39 USCEN:JQCDR.Q 5 REAL PCE-DUR,QTY INDEX (2000=100),SA,SA-US
40 USCEN:JQCNR.Q 5 REAL PCE-NDUR,QTY INDEX (2000=100),SA,SA-US
41 USCEN:JQCSVR.Q 5 REAL PCE-SVC,QTY INDEX (2000=100),SA,SA-US
42 USCEN:JQCXFAER.Q 5 REAL PCE EX FOOD&ENERGY,QTY INDEX (2000=100),SAAR-US
43 DRIINTL:CGRCUS.Q 5 REAL GOVERNMENT CONS. EXPEND.& GROSS INVESTMENT (CHAINED-2000), SA - U.S.
44 USCEN:I.Q 5* GROSS PRIV DOM INVEST,BILLIONS OF $,SAAR-US
45 USCEN:IF.Q 5* GROSS PRIV DOM INVEST-FIXED,BILLIONS OF $,SAAR-US
46 USCEN:IFNRE.Q 5* GROSS PRIV DOM INVEST-FIXED NONRES,BILLIONS OF $,SAAR-US
47 USCEN:IFRES.Q 5* PRIV FIXED INVEST-RES-STRUC,BILLIONS OF $,SAAR-US
48 USCEN:IFRE.Q 5* GROSS PRIV DOM INVEST-FIXED RES,BILLIONS OF $,SAAR-US
49 USCEN:II.Q 1 GROSS PRIV DOM INVEST-CH IN PRIV INVENT,BILLIONS OF $,SAAR-US
50 USCEN:IIF.Q 1 GROSS PRIV DOM INVEST-CH IN PRIV INVENT-FARM,BILLIONS OF $,SAAR-US
51 BASIC:HSFR.M 4 HOUSING STARTS:NONFARM(1947-58);TOTAL FARM&NONFARM(1959-)(THOUS.,SA
52 BASIC:HMOB.M 4 MOBILE HOMES: MANUFACTURERS’ SHIPMENTS (THOUS.OF UNITS,SAAR)
53 BASIC:PMNV.M 1 NAPM INVENTORIES INDEX (PERCENT)
54 BASIC:PMNO.M 1 NAPM NEW ORDERS INDEX (PERCENT)
55 BASIC:PMDEL.M 1 NAPM VENDOR DELIVERIES INDEX (PERCENT)
56 BASIC:MOCMQ.M 5 NEW ORDERS (NET) - CONSUMER GOODS & MATERIALS, 1996 DOLLARS (BCI)
57 BASIC:MSONDQ.M 5 NEW ORDERS, NONDEFENSE CAPITAL GOODS, IN 1996 DOLLARS (BCI)
58 USCEN:M.Q 5 IMPORTS OF GDS&SVC,BILLIONS OF $,SAAR-US
59 USCEN:X.Q 5 EXPORTS OF GDS&SVC,BILLIONS OF $,SAAR-US
60 BASIC:FSPCOM.M 5 S&P’S COMMON STOCK PRICE INDEX: COMPOSITE (1941-43=10)
61 BASIC:FSPIN.M 5 S&P’S COMMON STOCK PRICE INDEX: INDUSTRIALS (1941-43=10)
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62 BASIC:FSDXP.M 1 S&P’S COMPOSITE COMMON STOCK: DIVIDEND YIELD (% PER ANNUM)
63 BASIC:FSPXE.M 1 S&P’S COMPOSITE COMMON STOCK: PRICE-EARNINGS RATIO (%,NSA)
64 BASIC:EXRUK.M 5 FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATE: UNITED KINGDOM (CENTS PER POUND)
65 BASIC:EXRCAN.M 5 FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATE: CANADA (CANADIAN $ PER U.S.$)
66 BASIC:FYGM3.M 1 INTEREST RATE: U.S.TREASURY BILLS,SEC MKT,3-MO.(% PER ANN,NSA)
67 BASIC:FYGM6.M 1 INTEREST RATE: U.S.TREASURY BILLS,SEC MKT,6-MO.(% PER ANN,NSA)
68 BASIC:FYGT1.M 1 INTEREST RATE: U.S.TREASURY CONST MATURITIES,1-YR.(% PER ANN,NSA)
69 BASIC:FYGT5.M 1 INTEREST RATE: U.S.TREASURY CONST MATURITIES,5-YR.(% PER ANN,NSA)
70 BASIC:FYGT10.M 1 INTEREST RATE: U.S.TREASURY CONST MATURITIES,10-YR.(% PER ANN,NSA)
71 BASIC:FYAAAC.M 1 BOND YIELD: MOODY’S AAA CORPORATE (% PER ANNUM)
72 BASIC:FYBAAC.M 1 BOND YIELD: MOODY’S BAA CORPORATE (% PER ANNUM)
73 FYGM6-FYFF 1
74 FYGM3-FYFF 1
75 FYGT1-FYFF 1
76 FYGT5-FYFF 1
77 FYGT10-FYFF 1
78 FYAAAC-FYFF 1
79 FYBAAC-FYFF 1
80 BASIC:FM1.M 5 MONEY STOCK: M1(CURR,TRAV.CKS,DEM DEP,OTHER CK’ABLE DEP)(BIL$,SA)
81 BASIC:FM2.M 5 MONEY STOCK:M2(M1+O’NITE RPS,EURO$,G/P&B/D MMMFS&SAV&SM TIME DEP(BIL$)
82 USCEN:MNY2@00.M 5 MONEY SUPPL-M2 IN 2000 $,SA-US
83 BASIC:FMFBA.M 5 MONETARY BASE, ADJ FOR RESERVE REQUIREMENT CHANGES(MIL$,SA)
84 BASIC:FMRRA.M 5 DEPOSITORY INST RESERVES:TOTAL,ADJ FOR RESERVE REQ CHGS(MIL$,SA)
85 BASIC:FMRNBA.M 2 DEPOSITORY INST RESERVES:NONBORROWED,ADJ RES REQ CHGS(MIL$,SA)
86 USCEN:ALCIBL00Z.M 5 COML&IND LOANS OUTST,SA-US
87 BASIC:FCLBMC.M 1 WKLY RP LG COM’L BANKS:NET CHANGE COM’L & INDUS LOANS(BIL$,SAAR)
88 BASIC:CCINRV.M 5 CONSUMER CREDIT OUTSTANDING - NONREVOLVING(G19)
89 DRIINTL:PGDP@US.Q 5 NIA PRICE DEFLATOR - GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, SA - U.S.
90 DRIINTL:PCP@US.Q 5 NIA PRICE DEFLATOR - PRIVATE CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE, SA - U.S.
91 USCEN:PDII.Q 5 GROSS PRIV DOM INVEST,PRICE DEFLATORS (2000=100),SA,SA-US
92 USCEN:JPCD.Q 5 PCE-DUR,PRICE INDEX (2000=100),SA,SA-US
93 USCEN:JPCN.Q 5 PCE-NDUR,PRICE INDEX (2000=100),SA,SA-US
94 USCEN:JPCSV.Q 5 PCE-SVC,PRICE INDEX (2000=100),SA,SA-US
95 BASIC:PUXM.M 5 CPI-U: ALL ITEMS LESS MEDICAL CARE (82-84=100,SA)
96 BASIC:PUXHS.M 5 CPI-U: ALL ITEMS LESS SHELTER (82-84=100,SA)
97 BASIC:PUXF.M 5 CPI-U: ALL ITEMS LESS FOOD (82-84=100,SA)
98 BASIC:PUS.M 5 CPI-U: SERVICES (82-84=100,SA)
99 BASIC:PUCD.M 5 CPI-U: DURABLES (82-84=100,SA)
100 BASIC:PUC.M 5 CPI-U: COMMODITIES (82-84=100,SA)
101 BASIC:PUNEW.M 5 CPI-U: ALL ITEMS (82-84=100,SA)
102 BASIC:PWFSA.M 5 PRODUCER PRICE INDEX: FINISHED GOODS (82=100,SA)
103 BASIC:PMCP.M 1 NAPM COMMODITY PRICES INDEX (PERCENT)
104 UOMO83 1 COMPONENT INDEX OF CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS, NSA, CONFBOARD AND U.MICH.
105 DRIINTL:JLEAD@US.Q 5 COMPOSITE CYCLICAL INDICATOR (1996) - LEADING, SA - U.S.
106 DRIINTL:JLAG@US.Q 5 COMPOSITE CYCLICAL INDICATOR (1996) - LAGGING, SA - U.S.
107 DRIINTL:JCOIN@US.Q 5 COMPOSITE CYCLICAL INDICATOR (1996) - COINCIDENT, SA - U.S.
108 FYBAAC-FYGT10.M 1 BAA SPREAD
109 USCEN:NC16&Z.M 0 CIVILIAN NONINSTITUTIONAL POP: 16 YEARS&OVER,SA-US
110 BASIC:FYFF.M 1 INTEREST RATE: FEDERAL FUNDS (EFFECTIVE) (% PER ANNUM,NSA)
25
References
[1] Adrian, T. and Ashcraft, A.B. (2012) “Shadow Banking Regulation”, Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, Staff Report N. 559.
[2] Adrian, T. and Shin, H.S. (2011a) “Financial Intermediary Balance Sheet Management”
Annual Review of Financial Economics, 3, 289-307.
[3] Adrian, T. and Shin, H.S. (2011b) “Financial Intermediaries and Monetary Economics”
Ch. 12 in the Handbook of Monetary Economics (eds) Benjamin Friedman and Michael
Woodford, Elsevier. 2011
[4] Adrian, T. and Shin, H.S. (2010) “The Changing Nature of Financial Intermediation and
the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009”. Annual Review of Economics. 2:603-18.
[5] Allen, F. and Gale, D. (2000) “Financial Contagion”. The Journal of Political Economy,
108(1): 1-33.
[6] Altunbas, Yener, Gambacorta, Leonardo and Marques-Ibanez, David (2009) “Securitisa-
tion and the bank lending channel,” European Economic Review, 53(8): 996-1009.
[7] Bai, J., and S. Ng (2002), “Determining the Number of Factors in Approximate Factor
Models,” Econometrica 70:1,191-221.
[8] Bernanke, B.S. and Gertler, M. (1995) “Inside the Blanck Box: The Credit Channel of
Monetary Policy Transmission”. Journal of Economic Perspectives. 9(4). Fall 1995: 27-48
[9] Bernanke, B.S., J. Boivin and P. Eliasz (2005),“Measuring the Effects of Monetary Policy:
a Factor-augmented Vector Autoregressive (FAVAR) Approach,” Quarterly Journal of
Economics 120: 387–422.
[10] Boivin, J., and Giannoni, M.(2006) “Has Monetary Policy Become More Effective?”,
The Review of Economics and Statistics 88(3): 445-462.
26
[11] Boivin, J., Kiley M. T. and Mishkin, F.S. (2011) “How has the monetary transmission
mechanism evolved over time?” Ch. 8 in the Handbook of Monetary Economics (eds)
Benjamin Friedman and Michael Woodford, Elsevier. 2011
[12] Brunnermeier, M. Dong,G. and Paliab, D. (2012)“Banks’ Non-Interest Income and Sys-
temic Risk,” mimeo
[13] Canova, F. and Gambetti, L. (2009) “Structural Changes in the US Economy: Is there
a Role for Monetary Policy?,” Journal of Economic, Dynamics & Control, 33, 477-490.
[14] Clarida R., Gali J. and Gertler M. (2000) “Monetary Policy Rules and Macroeconomic
Stability: Evidence and some Theory,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 115, 147-180.
[15] Cogley, T. and Sargent, T. (2005) “Drift and Volatilities: Monetary Policy and Out-
comes in the Post WWII U.S.,” Review of Economic Dynamics, 8(2), 262-302.
[16] Diebold F. X. and Yilmaz K. (2011a) “On the Network Topology of Variance Decompo-
sitions: Measuring the Connectedness of Financial Firms,” NBER Working Papers 17490,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[17] Diamond, D. W. and Dybvig, P. H. (1983) “Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liq-
uidity”. The Journal of Political Economy, 91(3): 401-419.
[18] Diebold F. X. and Yilmaz K. (2012) “Better to Give than to Receive: Predictive Di-
rectional Measurement of Volatility Spillovers (with discussion),” International Journal of
Forecasting, 28, 57-66.
[19] Diebold F. X. and Yilmaz K. (2013) “On the Network Topology of Variance Decom-
positions: Measuring the Connectedness of Financial Firms,” Journal of Econometrics,
forthcoming.
[20] Dynan K, Elmendorf D.W. and Sichel D.E. (2006) “Can Financial Innovation Help to
Explain the Reduced Volatility of Economic Activity?” Journal of Monetary Economics
53: 123.
27
[21] Gennaioli, N., Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny (2013). “Finance and the Preservation of
Wealth”, mimeo
[22] Gennaioli, N., Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny (2012). “Money Doctors”, mimeo
[23] Greenwood, R. and Scharfstein, D. (2013) “The Growth of Modern Finance”. Journal
of Economic Perspectives, 27(2): 3-28.
[24] Gorton, G. (2009) “The Panic of 2007,” in Maintaining Stability in a Changing Financial
System, Proceedings of the 2008 Jackson Hole Conference, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas
City.
[25] Gorton, G., and Metrik, A. (2012) “Securitization” in The Handbook of the Economics
of Finance, ed. G. Constantinides, M. Harris, and R. Stulz, forthcoming.
[26] Gorton, G., and A. Winton (2003): “Financial Intermediation,” in Handbook of the
Economics of Finance, ed. by G. M. Constantinides, M. Harris, and R. Stulz, pp. 431-552,
North Holland. Elsevier.
[27] Hahm, H.J., Shin, H.S. and Shin, K. (forthcoming) “Non-Core Bank Liabilities and
Financial Vulnerability”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking.
[28] Keys,B.,Mukherjee, T, Seru, A. and V. Vig (2010) “Did Securitization Lead to Lax
Screening? Evidence From Subprime Loans”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
125(1): 307-362.
[29] Kim, C.-J. and Nelson C. (1999) “Has the U.S. Economy Become More Stable? A
Bayesian Approach Based on a Markov-Switching Model of the Business Cycle,” The
Review of Economics and Statistics, November, 81 (4), 608-616.
[30] Mesonnier J.-S. and Stevanovic D. (2012), “Bank Leverage Shocks and the Macroecon-
omy: a New Look in a Data-rich Environment,” Working Paper 394, Banque de France
[31] Ng, S. and D. Stevanovic (2012), “Factor-augmented Autoregressive Distributed Lag
Models,” mimeo, Columbia University.
28
[32] Ordonez, G and Gorton, G (2012) “Collateral Crises” NBER Working Paper n.17771.
[33] Philippon, T. (2012) “Has the US Finance Industry Become Less Efficient?”, mimeo.
[34] Philippon, T. and Reshef, A. (forthcoming) “Wages and Human Capital in the U.S.
Financial Industry: 1909-2006”, Quarterly Journal of Economics.
[35] Philippon, T. and Reshef, A. (2013) “An international look at the growth of modern
finance.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 27(2): 73-96.
[36] Pozsar, Z., Adrian, T. Ashcraft, A. and Boesky, H. (2012) “Shadow Banking”, Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, Staff Report N. 458.
[37] Primiceri, G. (2005) “Time Varying Structural Vector Autoregressions and Monetary
Policy,” Review of Economic Studies, 72, 821-852.
[38] Sellon, G.H. (2002) “The Changing U.S. Financial System: Some Implications for the
Monetary Transmission Mechanism,” Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic
Review, 5-35.
[39] Sims C. and Zha T. (2006) “Where There Regime Switches in U.S. Monetary Policy,”
American Economic Review 41, 788-829.
[40] Stock J.H. and Watson M.W. (2002) “Has the Business Cycle Changed and Why?,”
NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2002, Mark Gertler and Ken Rogoss (eds), MIT Press.
29
Figure 1: Asset Shares of Different Actors (source: FED Flow of Funds)
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Figure 2: The Measure of Connectedness: U.S. 1952-2009, Traditional Actors
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Figure 3: The Measure of Connectedness: U.S. 1952-2009, Insurance Companies
and Mutual Funds
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Figure 4: The Measure of Connectedness: U.S. 1952-2009, Pension Funds
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Figure 5: The Measure of Connectedness: U.S. 1952-2009, Shadow Banking
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Figure 6: The Measure of Connectedness: U.S. 1952-2009
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Figure 7: Shares of Credit Market Instruments
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Figure 8: Shares of Credit Market Instruments
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Figure 9: Measure of Connectedness and Share of Finance in GDP (Philippon
2012)
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Figure 10: Comparison of IRFs to a monetary policy shock conditional on different
degrees of Connectedness in SVAR
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Figure 11: IRFs to a monetary policy shock with C = 0.98 in SVAR
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Figure 12: IRFs to a monetary policy shock with C = 0.82 in SVAR
0 4 8 12 16
−0.1
−0.08
−0.06
−0.04
−0.02
0
0.02
0.04
PSCCOM
0 4 8 12 16
−10
−5
0
5
x 10−3 GDP
0 4 8 12 16
−0.5
−0.4
−0.3
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
GDPDEF
0 4 8 12 16
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
FFR
35
Figure 13: Difference between IRFs to a monetary policy shock with different
levels of Connectedness
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Figure 14: Comparison of IRFs to a monetary policy shock in FAVAR, C = 0.98
and C = 0.82, Real Variables
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Figure 15: Difference between IRFs to a monetary policy shock with different
levels of Connectedness, FAVAR Real Variables
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Figure 16: Comparison of IRFs to a monetary policy shock in FAVAR, C = 0.98
and C = 0.82, Financial Variables
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Figure 17: Difference between IRFs to a monetary policy shock with different
levels of Connectedness, FAVAR Financial Variables
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